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Ethnicity and social cohesion in the post-Soviet
Baltic states
NILS MUIZNIEKS, JURIS ROZENVALDS AND IEVA BIRKA
ABSTRACT This article examines the efforts of post-Soviet Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania to promote social cohesion by addressing the ethnic and linguistic
cleavages that are part of the legacy of Soviet rule. In examining the particular
situation of each Baltic state and the response to international pressure for
integration and social inclusion policy, Muiznieks, Rozenvalds and Birka note
the roles of threat-perception, the historic context, the linguistic and citizenship
policy, as well as socio-economic inequality, in facilitating Russian-speakers’ sense of
belonging to their respective Baltic state. While ostensibly aimed at fostering a sense
of belonging to the national state, Baltic integration and social inclusion policy has
often had a contradictory effect, especially in Estonia and Latvia, where the emphasis
on the majority language and culture as a prerequisite for access to citizenship and
formal membership has enhanced the threat-perceptions of minorities, and led to
their alienation or identification with the external homeland of Russia. In Lithuania,
early inclusion of minorities into the polity has had a beneficial long-term impact
in terms of their identification with their country of residence, demonstrated by the
fact that Russian-speakers express a greater sense of belonging to Lithuania. A
review of the available survey data on the Baltic states suggests that the same cannot
be said for Estonia and Latvia, where minorities express a weak sense of belonging
to the state. This suggests a challenging road ahead for Estonia and Latvia in
achieving social cohesion, understood by minorities as a sense of membership in the
community and feelings of mutual recognition. Furthermore, all three Baltic states,
Latvia in particular, have yet to address growing socio-economic inequality, which
threatens to cause long-term difficulties for social cohesion.
KEYWORDS Baltic states, belonging, citizenship, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, minorities,
Russian-speakers, sense of belonging, social cohesion, social integration, socio-economic
inequality
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia participate in broader European debates andpolicy initiatives on social cohesion, social inclusion and the integration
of immigrants and refugees. However, the focus in the Baltic region to date
has not been on addressing socio-economic inequality or the adaptation of
the small number of post-Soviet new arrivals. Rather, the Baltic states have
sought to overcome ethno-political and linguistic cleavages that are part of
the legacy of Soviet rule. In Estonia and Latvia in particular, the emphasis
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has been on the integration of the large post-war Russian-speaking settler
populations and their descendants.
This article examines Baltic efforts to promote social cohesion, efforts that
have been hampered by the Soviet legacy of unequal bilingualism and the
resulting sense of cultural threat perceived by majorities, particularly in
Estonia and Latvia. Less salient threat-perceptions have permitted Lithuania
to opt for an early inclusion of minorities in the polity, a decision that has
positively contributed to that country’s efforts to instil among minorities a
sense of belonging to the Lithuanian state.
Latvia and Estonia have been less successful at facilitating minorities’
sense of belonging and have largely focused on linguistic policy as a means
of civic and cultural integration. While all three Baltic states have placed a
disproportionate emphasis on language policy, the less demographically
fraught context in Lithuania has meant that the linguistic measures have not
been as controversial and have been decoupled from citizenship policy.
In socio-economic terms, Estonia has had the best record in promoting
equality; however, it continues to struggle with more pronounced ethnic
stratification than the other Baltic countries. In order to highlight the
achievements and failures of social cohesion, the final section of the article
will provide a review of the available survey data on the Baltic states to
reflect popular opinions and the feelings of belonging among their residents.
The review suggests that, more than twenty years after independence, there
remain serious challenges ahead for Estonia and Latvia in fostering a sense
of belonging among minorities.
Historical context
As can be seen in Table 1, the ethnic composition of the three Baltic states has
undergone massive change since the interwar years of independence (1918
40). The ethnic predominance of Lithuanians in their territory has remained
constant, though the size of the Polish community increased after the Second
World War with the transfer of Vilnius from Polish to Soviet control. In
Estonia and Latvia, the size of the indigenous ethnic group decreased
significantly after 1940, due to war deaths, flight to the West, deportations to
the East and the massive post-war immigration of Soviet workers. At the
same time, the size of the Russian population grew significantly until 1989,
when it began to decline somewhat due to emigration in the early 1990s.
The challenge to social cohesion posed by ethnic diversity has been
exacerbated by past Soviet policy, which did little to promote knowledge of
the local languages and cultures among settlers or to encourage contact
between them and Balts. Soviet policy granted a privileged role to the
Russian language in all the USSR’s republics, including in the Baltic. Settlers
were provided with few opportunities and incentives to learn the local
languages, while their children could acquire education from kindergarten


































through to university in Russian. Non-Russian minorities (such as Ukrai-
nians, Belarusians, Poles etc.) were deprived of their cultural and educa-
tional infrastructures and many came to regard Russian as their native
language (hence the term ‘Russian-speakers’).
At the same time, knowledge and use of Russian was promoted through
various means, and Russian was the lingua franca in the Soviet military
and other security services, the Communist Party and large segments of
the economy. As can be seen in Table 2, this resulted in asymmetric
bilingualism, whereby many settlers remained monolingual Russian-speak-
ers unable to communicate with the Balts except in Russian, which became
widely used among the indigenous ethnic or ‘titular’ populations, especially
in Latvia.
Ethnolinguistic cleavages acquired political and security aspects during
the independence struggle from 1988 to 1991. Significant segments of the
minority communities in all three Baltic states joined overwhelmingly Slavic
‘internationalist movements’ that forged an alliance with pro-Soviet Com-
munists and the security services loyal to Moscow. In Latvia and Estonia,
Table 1 Ethnic composition of the Baltic states from the interwar years to the present (%)
Indigenous ethnic Russian Polish Other
Lithuania (1923) 83.9 2.7 3.2 10.2
Interwar period Latvia (1935) 75.5 10.6 2.5 11.4
Estonia (1934) 88.2 8.5 0.1 3.2
Lithuania 79.6 9.4 7.0 4.0
1989 Latvia 52.0 34.0 2.3 11.7
Estonia 61.5 30.3 0.2 8.0
Lithuania (2011) 83.9 5.4 6.6 4.1
2010 Latvia (2009) 59.3 27.8 2.4 10.5
Estonia (2010) 68.8 25.5 0.1 5.6
Sources: For the interwar years, Andres Kasekamp, A History of the Baltic States (Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan 2010), 17; for 1989, Goskomstat SSSR, Natsional’nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR
(Moscow: Finansy i statistika 1991), 919; for 2010, national statistics offices.











Estonia 963,269 33.6 474,815 13.7
Latvia 1,387,647 65.7 905,515 21.2
Lithuania 2,924,048 37.4 343,597 33.5
Source: Goskomstat SSSR, Natsional’nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR.


































about a third of all Russian-speakers supported the pro-Soviet movement.1
In Lithuania, the pro-Soviet movement*called VienybėEdinstvo Jednosč
(Unity)*united both anti-independence Russian-speakers and a significant
segment of Poles. While these movements demobilized after independence
in 1991, doubts about their ‘loyalty’ among Balts remained.
In Estonia and Lithuania, the minority issue has had a stronger regional
dimension than in Latvia, where all the major cities have a significant
Russian-speaking minority and sometimes even a majority. In Estonia, in
addition to settling in the capital Tallinn, approximately one-third of the
Russian-speaking population is concentrated in the northeastern county of
Ida-Virumaa, where it constitutes an overwhelming local majority. In
Lithuania, ethnic Poles and Russians are concentrated not only around the
capital Vilnius, but also in the southeastern part of the country, where half
the population is Lithuanian and one-third is Polish.
The spatial distribution of minorities has affected the intensity of inter-
ethnic contact as well as the nature of the demands emanating from the
minority communities. In the late 1980s, about 90 per cent of ethnic
Estonians and Lithuanians entered endogamous marriages, while in Latvia
the figure was about 80 per cent. In both Lithuania and Estonia, there were
unsuccessful attempts on the part of minorities to gain territorial autonomy,
in certain heavily Polish districts of Lithuania during the independence
struggle and in the northeast of Estonia in 19923.
The post-Soviet transformation and the ‘nationalization’ of
citizenship
In the autumn of 1991, Estonian and Latvian legislators adopted citizenship acts
according to which all residents who had been citizens on 16 June 1940 and their
descendants had their citizenship rights ‘restored’. This ‘restoration’ meant that
all post-war settlers and their descendants*about 740,000 inhabitants of Latvia
and 500,000 of Estonia*overnight became ‘non-citizens’ (in Latvia’s terminol-
ogy) or ‘aliens’ (in Estonia’s terminology).2 Accordingly, these ‘non-citizens’
could not participate in the first post-independence parliamentary elections,
which took place in Estonia in 1992 and in Latvia in 1993.
Thus, legal means were used to diminish the political influence of post-war
settlers and their descendants, who were left with three options: taking the
1 Nils Muiznieks, ‘The pro-Soviet movement in Latvia’, Report on the USSR (Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty), vol. 2, no. 34, 1990, 19 24; Toomas Hendrick Ilves, ‘Reaction:
the Intermovement in Estonia’, in Jan Arveds Trapans (ed.), Toward Independence: The
Baltic Popular Movements (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1991), 71 84 (73).
2 Nils Muiznieks (ed.), Latvia Human Development Report 1995 (Riga: United Nations
Development Programme 1995), 22; Vadim Poleshchuk, Non-Citizens in Estonia. Report
2004 (Tallinn: Legal Information Centre for Human Rights 2004), 9.


































citizenship of another country (usually Russia), naturalizing or remaining
‘non-citizens’/‘aliens’. The Estonian authorities initially required all ‘aliens’ to
acquire ‘temporary residence permits’, implying the possibility that they
could be revoked and that ‘aliens’ would then lose their right to residency in
Estonia. This generated significant fears among ‘aliens’ about their status, and
many acquired citizenship of the Russian Federation. In Latvia a 1995 law
granted ‘non-citizens’ permanent residence rights automatically. As a result,
on 1 May 2013, 122,746 persons in Estonia had citizenship of another country,
of which 93,795 (or 76.4 per cent) were citizens of the Russian Federation.3 At
the beginning of 2013, Latvia, by contrast, had only 66,188 foreign citizens, of
which 43,586 (65.9 per cent) were citizens of the Russian Federation.4
In Estonia, naturalization began in 1992, while in Latvia not until 1995.
Naturalization initially took place in Estonia according to the rather liberal
provisions of the 1938 law on citizenship. Thus, as can be seen in Figure 1,
more than half of all naturalizations overall (87,712 of 154,874) from 1992 to
2012 took place in the period 1992 through 1996. In a 1995 law, citizenship
requirements were made stricter and all candidates had to pass a language
examination, leading to a significant drop in naturalization rates.
In 1994 Latvia adopted a citizenship law that implemented rather strict
linguistic and other requirements; it also created a system of ‘age brackets’
whereby a timetable (from 1996 through 2003) was created in which different
categories of ‘non-citizens’ were allowed to submit applications depending on
where and when they were born and arrived in Latvia. As a result of concerted
arm-twisting by the EU, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE) and some member states, Latvian legislators proposed amend-
ments to the citizenship law to remove the system of age brackets that had
limited the scope of those eligible to apply for citizenship, and to allow the
possibility of registering stateless children born in Latvia without any examina-
tions. The amendments were sufficiently controversial that they were put to a
referendum in October 1998 in which the majority of citizens approved them.5
In December 1998 the Estonian parliament also amended its citizenship act
to grant citizenship on easy terms to stateless children.6 As can be seen in
Figure 1, this change led to a significant jump in naturalization rates in Latvia,
which peaked immediately after EU accession in 2004.
3 ‘Citizenship’, 1 May 2013, available on the Estonia.eu website at http://estonia.eu/
about-estonia/society/citizenship.html (viewed 8 May 2013).
4 Pilsonı̄bas un migrācijas lietu pārvalde (PMLP, Office of Citizenship and Migration
Affairs), ‘Latvijas iedzı̄votāju sadalı̄jums pēc valstiskās piederı̄bas’, 1 January 2013,
available on the PMLP website at www.pmlp.gov.lv/lv/statistika/dokuments/2013/
ISVP_Latvija_pec_VPD.pdf (viewed 8 May 2013).
5 Nils Muiznieks and Ilze Brands Kehris, ‘The European Union, democratization and
minorities in Latvia’, in Paul J. Kubicek (ed.), The European Union and Democratization
(London: Routledge 2003), 30 55 (39 42).
6 Vello Pettai and Kristina Kallas, ‘Estonia: conditionality amidst a legal straightjacket’, in
Bernd Rechel (ed.), Minority Rights in Central and Eastern Europe (London and New
York: Routledge 2009), 104 18 (111).


































Despite the fact that some form of citizenship became accessible to almost
all post-war settlers in Estonia and Latvia, many have not taken any steps to
naturalize. Survey data of non-citizens in Estonia and Latvia suggest that the
lack of motivation to naturalize is the result of a combination of psycholo-
gical barriers, such as finding the process ‘humiliating’ or considering that
citizenship for them should be ‘automatic’, and linguistic concerns, includ-
ing being unable to pass the language examinations.7 Thus, at the start of
2013, Latvia still had 297,883 ‘non-citizens’ and Estonia had 90,533 ‘aliens’.8
While the latter have the right to vote in municipal elections, non-citizens in
Latvia do not. However, both sets of non-citizens have internationally
recognized travel documents and benefit from facilitated travel to Russia
and the CIS countries. They also enjoy most of the same social and economic
rights as citizens, though Latvia in particular has barred non-citizens from



















































1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Estonia 5421 20370 22474 16674 22773 8124 9969 4534 3425 3090 4091
Latvia 984 3016 2992 4439 12427 14900 10637 9844
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Estonia 3706 6523 7072 4753 4228 2124 1670 1184 1513 1156
Latvia 10049 16064 19169 16439 6826 3004 2080 2336 2467 2213
Sources: For Estonia, ‘Citizenship’; for Latvia, PMLP, ‘Statistics on naturalization’, 28 February 2013,
available on the PMLP website at www.pmlp.gov.lv/en/statistics/citizen.html (viewed 8 May 2013)
7 See PMLP, ‘Pētı̄jums: Nepilsonu viedoklis par Latvijas pilsonibas iegusanu’, 2011, 11,
available on the PMLP website at www.pmlp.gov.lv/lv/par_pmlp/publikacijas/
petijumi.html (viewed 9 April 2013); Kvantitatı̄vs un kvalitatı̄vs pētı̄jums par sabiedrı̄bas
integrācijas un pilsonı̄bas aktuālajiem aspektiem, 2008, 21, available on the Ministry of
Education and Science, Republic of Latvia website at http://izm.izm.gov.lv/upload_file/
jaunatne/petijumi/Cela_uz_pilsonisku_sabiedribu_06112008[1][1].pdf (viewed 1 May
2013); Poleshchuk, Non-Citizens in Estonia, 19. All translations are by the authors unless
otherwise stated.
8 For Latvia, see PMLP, ‘Latvijas iedzı̄votāju sadalı̄jums pēc valstiskās piederı̄bas’; for
Estonia, see ‘Citizenship’.


































working in most civil service jobs in accordance with the Latvian State Civil
Service Law.9
The post-Soviet transformation and the ‘nationalization’ of the
linguistic sphere
The political domination of the ‘titular nations’ was used to bring about the
‘nationalization’ of the linguistic sphere. Throughout the 1990s, the core
policy direction in all three Baltic states involved strengthening the ‘titular’
languages vis-à-vis Russian. This was initially done primarily through the
use of ‘sticks’, namely, attempts to regulate language use through legislation.
The use of ‘carrots’*making the titular languages attractive and accessible,
and providing assistance in acquiring them*followed later, primarily as the
result of international support and pressure.
In 1992 Latvian legislators amended the language act substantially,
making knowledge of Latvian a prerequisite for many posts in the public
and private sectors. Tens of thousands of people were required to undergo
language testing and, thenceforth, state-funded higher education was
available only in Latvian.10 A similar process took place in Estonia, where
legislators adopted a new language law in 1995 requiring knowledge of
Estonian for many posts and instituting a similar process of mass proficiency
testing.11 Lithuania began to implement language testing in 1993, but the
significantly smaller Russian population, as illustrated in Table 1, and the
higher level of ‘titular’ language knowledge among the Russian population,
as illustrated in Table 2, meant that language issues generated much less
controversy in Lithuania than in Estonia or Latvia.12
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the EU played
a critical role in assisting Latvia and Estonia in developing and funding
language training programmes. In 1994 and 1995, UNDP helped the Latvian
government devise, then implement, the ten-year National Programme for
Latvian Language Training, which developed new methodologies for
9 See James Hughes, ‘‘‘Exit’’ in deeply divided societies: regimes of discrimination in
Estonia and Latvia and the potential for Russophone migration’, Journal of Common
Market Studies, vol. 43, no. 4, 2005, 739 62; the 2001 Latvian State Civil Service Law is
available online at www.likumi.lv/doc.php?id10944 (viewed 19 April 2013).
10 See Angelita Kamenska, The State Language in Latvia: Achievements, Problems and
Prospects (Riga: Latvian Centre for Human Rights and Ethnic Studies 1995).
11 ‘Minority protection in Estonia’, in EU Accession Monitoring Program, Monitoring the
EU Accession Process: Minority Protection (Budapest: Open Society Institute 2001), 188
244 (190 2).
12 Priit Järve, ‘Language battles in the Baltic states: 1989 2002’, in Farimah Daftary and
Francois Grin (eds), Nation-Building, Ethnicity and Language Politics in Transition
Countries (Budapest: Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, Open
Society Institute 2003), 73 105 (91).


































teaching Latvian as a second language, prepared teacher trainers and drafted
teacher training materials. The programme then provided free language
training to various target groups.13 It was taken over by the government and
turned into a standing agency in 2004. In Estonia, a similar initiative was
launched, but only in 1998, under the auspices of the EU’s PHARE
programme.14
In 1998, both Estonia and Latvia passed new language legislation that
provoked strong criticism from the European Commission. The early
versions, debated from 1997 to the end of 1999, called for significant state
interference in the private sector to regulate language use. In criticizing the
legislation, the European Commission invoked the provisions of the Europe
Agreement, claiming that such interference could hinder the free movement
of people, goods and services and the establishment of companies.15 The
final versions of the laws, passed in Estonia in February 1999 and in Latvia in
December 1999, were deemed largely acceptable by the EU, though
subsequent years witnessed continued wrangling over the implementation
of the regulations. As can be seen in Table 3, minority proficiency in the
national languages had increased substantially by 2005, though more than a
quarter of Russian-speakers in both Estonia and Latvia claimed only ‘basic’
knowledge of the national languages fifteen years after independence.
Estonia drafted plans to shift to the national language as the primary medium
of instruction in Russian-language secondary schools in 1993, while Latvia did
so in 1998. However, due to strong domestic opposition and international
pressure, both countries moderated their goals, and settled on a model in which









Estonian Russian-speakers 73 64 23 50 26
Latvian Russian-speakers 81 67 23 48 28
Lithuanian Russian-speakers 90 81 49 41 10
Lithuanian Poles 90 80 36 58 7
Source: Eurobarometer 2005, cited in Marju Lauristin (ed.), Estonian Human Development Report
2010/2011: Baltic Way(s) of Human Development: Twenty Years On, trans. from the Estonian by Eero
Pajula, Urve Kivilo, Meelis Rohtla and Wiedemanni Tõlkebüroo (Tallinn: Estonian Cooperation
Assembly 2011), 119.
13 Aivars Tabuns, Nils Muiznieks, Boriss Cilevičs, Angelita Kamenska, Tatjana Liguta
and Ilmars Mezs, ‘National integration and social cohesion’, in Nils Muiznieks (ed.),
Latvia Human Development Report 1997 (Riga: UNDP 1997), 48 66 (58 60).
14 See ‘Minority protection in Estonia’, 209.
15 See Pettai and Kallas, ‘Estonia’, 111 12; Muiznieks and Brands Kehris, ‘The European
Union, democratization and minorities in Latvia’, 44 8.


































60 per cent of the curriculum was taught in the national language or bilingually
and 40 per cent in the minority language. In Latvia, the reform was implemented
from 20047, and sparked massive protests in 2003 and 2004. This experience
prompted Estonia to implement a more gradual transition, according to which
Estonian would be the language of instruction in all upper secondary schools by
the 201112 academic year.16 In Lithuania similar legislative provisions were
enacted in the education law in 2011, prompting vigorous protests from the
Poles and boycotts in some Polish-language schools.17
In all three countries, national authorities have argued that the goal of
language and education reform has been to promote the competitiveness of
minority youth by acquainting them with the national language from an
early age, thus facilitating the opportunity for higher education that is
available in the ‘titular’ languages and preparing them for the labour
market.18 Indeed, knowledge of the national languages has been shown to be
a critical asset in competing in the post-independence labour markets, which
have undergone a massive transformation with regard to the institutiona-
lization of the ‘titular’ language.19
Post-Soviet socio-economic transformation and social cohesion
Raivo Vetik and Jelena Hellemae have argued that a ‘nation-state model with
an ethnic connotation’ and neoliberal economic policies are interrelated and
mutually reinforcing, in that they both engender the creation of strongly
stratified status groups, weaken the cohesiveness of society and presume
group-targeted integration policies.20 All three Baltic states implemented
16 ‘Studies in Estonian in Russian-medium schools’, available on the Estonian Ministry of
Education and Research website at www.hm.ee/index.php?1510030 (viewed 8 May
2013).
17 Rokas Tracevskis, ‘Third round of the Lithuanian-Polish discussions on education’,
Baltic Times, 19 October 2011.
18 See Nils Muiznieks, ‘Minority education in Latvia: from segregation to integration’, 24
July 2004, available on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia website at
www.mfa.gov.lv/en/policy/4641/4642/FromSegregationToIntegration (viewed 30
April 2013); Gabrielle Hogan-Brun, ‘At the interface of language ideology and
practice: the public discourse surrounding the 2004 education reform in Latvia’,
Language Policy, vol. 5, no. 3, 2006, 315 35.
19 See Artis Pabriks, Etniskās proporcijas, nodarbinātı̄ba un diskriminācija Latvijā (Riga:
Nordik 2002), 18 22, available online at http://s3.amazonaws.com/politika/public/
article_files/1106/original/SFL_Pabriks_lv.pdf?1326907814 (viewed 30 April 2013);
Kristian-Olari Leping and Ott Toomet, ‘Emerging ethnic wage gap: Estonia during
political and economic transition’, Journal of Comparative Economics, vol. 36, no. 4, 2008,
599 619.
20 Raivo Vetik and Jelena Helemäe, ‘Conclusions’, in Raivo Vetik and Jelena Helemäe
(eds), The Russian Second Generation in Tallinn and Kohtla-Järve: The TIES Study in
Estonia (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2011), 229 38 (231).


































neoliberal economic reforms in the early and mid-1990s. In Estonia and
Latvia in particular, these policies destroyed old patterns of ethnic
stratification in the labour market.21 This was only possible because the
political clout of Russian-speakers had been diminished through the removal
of their citizenship. Data from the Norbalt living conditions survey suggest
that in the 1990s Russian-speakers experienced disproportionate levels of
unemployment and a greater risk of being excluded from the labour market,
but no significantly greater risk of poverty due to the welfare system.22
In the 2000s, socio-economic inequality between persons belonging to
different ethnolinguistic groups increased in Estonia, but decreased in
Latvia. A recent study found a consistently much higher unemployment
rate and greater job insecurity among minorities in Estonia and ‘a
tendency [for Russian-speakers] to belong to the ranks of blue collar,
rather than white collar workers’.23 These differences have persisted in
Estonia among the younger generation of Russian-speakers, who are far
less likely than their peers to get managerial, professional or specialist
jobs.24 In Latvia, by contrast, the labour market proved quite successful in
integrating Russian-speakers, and ethnic disparities in employment and
unemployment rates had largely disappeared until the onset of the
economic crisis in 2008.25
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are among the nine poorest member states
in the EU (referred to as ‘L9’ by Eurostat), where income per capita in 2009
was on average 45 per cent lower than the EU norm. While making some
progress towards income convergence in the mid-2000s, the global economic
crisis, which began in 2008, affected the Baltic states more severely than
other EU member states. The gap between household income in the L9 states
and the EU average has remained more or less the same. In Lithuania,
however, it increased by one percentage point, in Estonia by two percentage
points, and in Latvia by six percentage points (see Figure 2).
21 See John Dobson and Graham Jones, ‘Ethnic discrimination: public policy and the
Latvian labour market’, International Journal of Manpower, vol. 19, no. 1/2, 1998, 31 47;
Andrew Savchenko, ‘Toward capitalism or away from Russia? Early stage of post-
Soviet economic reforms in Belarus and the Baltics’, American Journal of Economics and
Sociology, vol. 61, no. 1, 2002, 233 57; Mihails Hazans, ‘Ethnic minorities in the Latvian
labour market, 1997 2009: outcomes, integration drivers and barriers’, in Nils
Muiznieks (ed.), How Integrated Is Latvian Society? An Audit of Achievements, Failures
and Challenges (Riga: University of Latvia Press 2010), 125 58.
22 Aadne Aasland and Tone Fløtten, ‘Ethnicity and social exclusion in Estonia and
Latvia’, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 53, no. 7, 2001, 1023 49.
23 Mati Heidmets (ed.), Estonian Human Development Report 2007 (Tallinn: Estonian
Cooperation Assembly 2008), 53.
24 Kristina Lindemann, ‘Explaining different returns from human capital in the labour
market’, in Vetik and Helemäe (eds), The Russian Second Generation in Tallinn and
Kohtla-Järve, 93 118.
25 Hazans, ‘Ethnic minorities in the Latvian labour market’.


































Income disparity is another source of social inequality in the Baltic states
that affects not only ethnic minorities but also the rest of the population.
When looking at the Eurostat data in Figure 3, it becomes evident that the
income gap in the Baltic states is of continuing concern. For the whole of
the EU, the wealthiest 20 per cent of households on average have an income
that is 4.9 times higher than that of the poorest 20 per cent of EU
households. If in 2000 Estonia had the greatest income inequality at 6.1
times the average, then by 2008 it had managed to nearly converge with the
EU average. Lithuania, which had been in the best situation in the Baltic in
2000, witnessed a serious downturn in 2004, but a more positive trend
thereafter. In contrast, Latvia has exhibited a steady trend of greater social
stratification based on income disparity over the recent years, and in 2008
the wealthiest households had an income that was 7.3 times higher than the
poorest households.
What accounts for these differences among the Baltic states? Since
independence they have each taken a different development path in regard
to social welfare system reforms. Even though all three Baltic states
underwent liberalization, which placed greater responsibility on the in-
dividual, and (as illustrated in Figure 4) still lag way behind the EU average
on the share of GDP devoted to social security, Estonia and Lithuania have
steadily increased the share of GDP spent on social welfare. Latvia, on the
other hand, from 2000 to 2007, continuously decreased expenditure on social
security, with a slight increase only in 2008. Moreover, throughout this
period, social expenditure per capita in Latvia was significantly smaller than
in Estonia or Lithuania. Thus, for example, in 2000, per capita annual social
security expenditure in Latvia (t547) was only 87 per cent of the level in
Estonia and 97 per cent of the level in Lithuania. By 2008 the difference had









Estonia 43 42 45 47 48 50 52 57 58 56 54 55
Latvia 36 36 39 42 44 45 49 52 56 48 48 51
Lithuania 44 44 46 50 51 54 56 57 61 60 64 64
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Source: Peeter Leetmaa, Denis Leythienne, Fabienne Montaigne and Pascal Wolff, ‘The 9 poorest
countries catching up on income per capita’, Statistics in Focus (Eurostat), no. 16, 2011, Table 2,
available on the Eurostat website at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-11-
016/EN/KS-SF-11-016-EN.PDF (viewed 1 May 2013)


































increased dramatically and Latvia’s expenditure (t1,283 per capita per
annum) was equal to only 71 per cent of that in Estonia and 81 per cent of
that in Lithuania (see Figure 4).
Thus, even though we have argued that socio-economic inequality
between persons belonging to different ethnolinguistic groups grew deeper
in Estonia in the 2000s, thanks to its commitment to social welfare the income
disparity has lessened, Estonia is not the least egalitarian of the
three Baltic states. In other words, although Russian-speakers in Estonia
may be more likely to be unemployed or belong to the ranks of blue-collar
workers,26 social security benefits will ensure that, in terms of social goods,
they will be on more equal footing with their Estonian counterparts.
However, in Latvia, where the labour market has been assumed to have
Figure 3 Average income inequality in the Baltic states (by quintile share ratio S80/S20)
6.1 5.3




2000 2005 2008 2011
Estonia Latvia Lithuania
Source: For 2000, Leetmaa, Leythienne, Montaigne and Wolff, ‘The 9 poorest countries catching up
on income per capita’, Table 4; for 200511, Eurostat, ‘S80/S20 income quintile share ratio by sex and
selected age group’, 27 May 2013, available on the Eurostat website at http://appsso.eurostat.ec.
europa.eu/nui/show.do?datasetilc_di11&langen (viewed 3 June 2013)






EU-27* 26.7 26.8 27.3 27.7 27.6 27.1 26.6 25.7 26.7 29.5
Lithuania 15.7 14.7 14 13.5 13.4 13.2 13.4 14.4 16.1 21.3
Latvia 15.7 14.7 14.3 14 13.2 12.8 12.7 11.3 12.7 16.8
Estonia 13.9 13 12.7 12.5 13 12.6 12.1 12.1 14.9 19.2
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
* The figures for 2000-4, before the EU expanded to include 27 countries, are for the Euro area.
Source: Eurostat, ‘Social protection statistics’, September 2012, available on the Eurostat website at
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Social_protection_statistics (viewed
1 May 2013)


































integrative functions, the ever decreasing commitment to social security has
resulted in more socio-economic inequality and stratification, posing long-
term challenges to social cohesion, not only among ethnolinguistic groups
but the population as a whole.
European pressure and the development of integration policy
As the Baltic states approached EU membership, Estonia and Latvia came
under significant pressure to develop policy frameworks to integrate
Russian-speakers. The Estonian parliament adopted the policy document
‘The Integration of Non-Estonians into Estonian Society: The Principles of
National Integration Policy’ on 10 February 1998; and, on 14 March
2000, it approved the state programme ‘Integration in Estonian Society
20002007’, which set out three goals: ‘linguistic-communicative integra-
tion’, ‘legal-political integration’ and ‘socio-economic integration’.
However, the various sub-programmes within the larger framework
clearly put the emphasis on the acquisition by minorities of the Estonian
language through the improvement of Estonian language competence in
minority elementary and secondary schools, including a shift in vocational
training to the Estonian language, and the organization of Estonian
language-training for minority teachers, journalists and other adults.27 While
reference was made to the preservation of cultural diversity, the focus was
clearly on the linguistic deficit of minorities.
Estonia adopted the follow-up ‘Estonian Integration Strategy 20082013’,
which sets out, as an objective, ‘to support the shared feeling of belonging in
the Estonian society among all permanent residents through sharing
common values and knowledge of the national language’.28 While continu-
ing to stress acquisition of Estonian, this strategy also includes addressing
labour market and income inequalities, regional differences, the integration
of new immigrants and differences in civil society participation rates of
Estonians and Russian-speakers.
The Latvian government took longer to approve a similar framework and
the end product was more diffuse. While a government steering group
began work on a framework document in March 1998, the ‘National
26 Heidmets (ed.), Estonian Human Development Report 2007, 53.
27 ‘State programme: ‘‘Integration in Estonian Society 2000 2007’’’, approved
by the Government of Estonia, 14 March 2000, available on the Estonian Ministry of
Culture website at www.kul.ee/webeditor/files/integratsioon/state_programme111.
pdf (viewed 2 May 2013).
28 ‘Estonian Integration Strategy 2008 2013 (Unofficial translation)’, 3, available on the
Estonian Ministry of Culture website at www.kul.ee/webeditor/files/integratsioon/
Loimumiskava_2008_2013_ENG.pdf (viewed 2 May 2013).


































Programme on the Integration of Society in Latvia’ was not adopted by the
government until February 2001. Because of political disagreements, the
programme was a messy compromise in which politically sensitive
minority-related issues (citizenship, language) were merged into a single
document along with issues pertaining to regional development and social
inclusion. As Juris Rozenvalds has noted elsewhere, despite reference to the
two-way nature of integration, ‘the emphasis is on the tasks for minorities*
the need to accept Latvian culture, understand history, be loyal, believe they
are needed, etc.’.29
In 2011 the Latvian government adopted the new policy document
‘Basic Principles on National identity, Civil Society and Integration Policy
(20122018)’.30 This document has a more ethnocentric focus than its
predecessor, stressing the special role of Latvians as the ‘nation of state’,
and the responsibility of the ‘Latvian language and cultural space’ as the
‘basis of national identity’ and a ‘cohesive social memory’. A sociological
survey conducted in 2010 asked respondents whether they supported
the statement that ‘the unity of Latvian society should be based on
the Latvian language and culture’. While 89 per cent of ethnic Latvian
respondents supported this statement, only 46 per cent of Russians did
so,31 suggesting serious problems ahead in putting the strategy into
practice.
To implement the programmes, both Estonia and Latvia created two
different kinds of institutional set-ups. First, both countries established
integration bodies: autonomous government agencies tasked with organiz-
ing grants competitions and integration funding initiatives ‘from below’.
While no detailed analysis of the Estonian foundation’s work has been
conducted, an analysis of the Latvian foundation’s work for 20016 found
that only 20 per cent of the projects supported in the early years involved
face-to-face intercultural contact.32
A second form of implementing agency was a separate ministry. From
1997 through 2009, Estonia had a Minister for Population and Ethnic Affairs,
while Latvia had a Special Assignments Minister for Social Integration
Affairs from 20029. The effectiveness of these offices was hampered by
29 Juris Rozenvalds, ‘The Soviet heritage and integration policy development since the
restoration of independence’, in Muiznieks (ed.), How Integrated Is Latvian Society?,
33 59 (55).
30 ‘Nacionālās identitātes, pilsoniskās sabiedrı̄bas un integrācijas politikas pamatnos-
tādnes (2012 2018)’, 20 October 2011, available on the Ministry of Culture of the
Republic of Latvia website at www.km.gov.lv/lv/doc/nozaru/integracija/Pamatnos-
tadnes/KMPam_071011_integ.pdf (viewed 6 May 2013).
31 Brigita Zepa and Evija Kļave, Latvija: pārskats par tautas attı̄stı̄bu. 2010/2011: Nacionālā
identitāte, mobilitāte un rı̄cı̄bspēja (Riga: Latvijas Universitātes Sociālo un politisko
pētı̄jumu institūts 2011), 25.
32 Ilona Kunda, ‘The Society Integration Foundation and ‘‘ethnic integration’’’, in
Muiznieks (ed.), How Integrated Is Latvian Society?, 61 89 (83).


































frequent changes of minister and, concomitantly, frequent changes in policy
emphasis. In 2009, in the context of budget austerity, separate ministries
devoted to promoting integration were scrapped in both countries and their
functions were distributed to various other ministries. While considerable
resources have been expended on seeking to promote integration, the
outcome in terms of strengthening the sense of belonging to the Baltic
states, especially among Russian-speakers, has been quite limited.
Impact of integration policies on sense of belonging
Thus far, this article has addressed the processes of transition in the post-
Soviet Baltic states, and the challenges to social cohesion posed by ethnicity
and the particular historical context, focusing on the role of citizenship,
socio-economic conditions and language policy. The following section looks
at the relationship between social cohesion and the sense of belonging,
employing the understanding that ‘social cohesion is a set of social processes
that help instill in individuals the sense of belonging to the same community
and the feeling that they are recognised as members of that community’.33
Specifically, this section looks at the relative success or failure of integration
policy in achieving a sense of belonging among the Russian-speaking
population in each Baltic state, drawing on theoretical discussions of the
concept of belonging and empirical research. The survey data illustrate how
the particular historical context, and the approach to integration used, hinder
the development of a sense of belonging among the Russian-speakers in
Latvia and Estonia.
John Shotter’s discussion of the concept of ‘belonging’ combines rational
considerations, such as the ability to influence decision-making and shape
the reality of everyday life, with the feeling that one’s voice is recognized
and heard.34 Such circumstances have to be grounded in a community that
provides meaning and that is envisioned as a common endeavour, thus
encouraging a sense of home. In social psychology, the factors of territorial
and relational dimensions are held to be instrumental in the development
of a sense of community. The territorial dimension, or physical rootedness,
refers to the territory inhabited and the belonging conditioned by land-
scape. The relational dimension, or the social bonding aspect, refers to the
33 Jane Jenson, Mapping Social Cohesion: The State of Canadian Research, Canadian Policy
Research Networks (CPRN) Study no. F/03 (Ottawa: Renouf Publishing 1998), 4,
available on the CPRN website at www.cprn.org/documents/15723_en.pdf (viewed
2 May 2013).
34 John Shotter, ‘Psychology and citizenship: identity and belonging’, in Bryan S. Turner
(ed.), Citizenship and Social Theory (London and Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications
1993), 115 38 (125 6).


































quality and nature of the relationships between the inhabitants within the
territory.35
Each Baltic state will be viewed as the territorial object of attachment. The
only distinction that will be made will be between individuals ‘for whom
one locality is all-inclusive of their remembered experiences, and those for
whom many places mark their histories and whose sense of belonging is to
that extent multilocal’.36 This distinction is particularly applicable because
the survey data cited below show that a large percentage of Baltic Russian-
language speakers identify with Russia as their homeland, irrespective of
their country of residence.
The discussion of sense of belonging in the Baltic states is hampered
by the fact that little comparative data on all three countries exists.
The last comparable data on the territorial identification of natives and
Russian-speakers in all three Baltic states date from 2004.37 Using these data,
Kjetil Duvold has written about the territorial identification of Russian-
speakers in the Baltic states,38 claiming that Baltic minorities did not identify
themselves with their respective countries of residence, as opposed to the
natives whose primary identification was with the national territory. A
significant portion of Russians in Latvia, 40 per cent, and Russians in
Estonia, 43 per cent, identified themselves with Russia. Only a small portion,
2 per cent of Russian-speakers in Estonia and 5 per cent of Russian-speakers
in Latvia, stated that their primary identification was with their country of
residence.39
The situation in Lithuania was surprisingly different. There, the majority
of Russian-speakers chose ‘Lithuania’ as either their primary or secondary
identity, although 10 per cent still identified with Russia.40 Identification
with Russia undermines a sense of belonging, as Gerli Nimmerfeldt has
shown using Estonian data. In her analysis, identification with Russia, or
considering Russia as the homeland, has a significant impact on feelings of
belonging to Estonia: ‘The odds of feeling strongly connected to Estonia are
35 Stephanie Riger and Paul J. Lavrakas, ‘Community ties, patterns of attachment and
social interaction in urban neighborhoods’, American Journal of Community Psychology,
vol. 9, no. 1, 1981, 55 66.
36 David Parkin, ‘Foreword’, in Nadia Lovell (ed.), Locality and Belonging (London and
New York: Routledge 1998), x xiv (xiii).
37 Richard Rose, New Baltic Barometer VI: A Post-Enlargement Survey, Studies in Public
Policy, no. 401 (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, Centre for the Study of Public
Policy 2005).
38 Kjetil Duvold, ‘If push comes to shove: territorial identification among the Baltic
Russians’, in Uncertain Transformations*New Domestic and International Challenges:
Proceedings of the International Conference, Riga, November 911, 2006 (Riga: LU
Akadēmiskais apgāds 2007), 293 304.
39 Ibid., 298.
40 Ibid., 298 9.


































3.33 times higher for those respondents who do not consider Russia their
homeland compared to those who do.’41
To account for inter-ethnic and Baltic variations, Duvold blames Soviet
history, and the legal steps taken in re-establishing independence, or legal
restorationism.42 Furthermore, Rogers Brubaker has discussed at length the
Soviet practice of ‘nativization’ (korenizatsiia), and how territorial and
personal nationhoods were institutionalized by employing an ethnic/
primordial conception of nation.43 In the Soviet Union, the titulars were
assigned ‘ownership’ of their respective territories, or republics, making
them the legitimate inhabitants. The Soviet practice of ascribing identities to
people based on their ethnic origin and language spoken, and the belief that
some people were the rightful ‘owners’ or residents of the respective
territories, carried over into the independent Baltic states in their conception
of the nation state. Accordingly, people’s sense of belonging is influenced by
the primordial construction of nation and they ‘tend to identify themselves
in ethno-lingual terms’,44 especially in Estonia and Latvia.
The 2004 survey data can be further supplemented with more resent
research findings in the individual states that support the earlier conclu-
sions. For example, in a 2006 survey conducted in Latvia that asked ‘How
close is your personal bond with Russia?’, 34 per cent of Russian-speakers
said their bond was ‘close’ and a further 10 per cent said their bond was
‘very close’.45 When looking at the latest survey data from Lithuania, the
earlier conclusion that Lithuanian Russian-speakers tend to identify with
Lithuania is also corroborated. The 200910 European, National and
Regional Identities (ENRI) project found that in Lithuania 80.6 per cent of
Russian-speakers expressed a closeness to Lithuania.46
This closeness can be explained by the way in which Lithuania went
about re-establishing independence and granting citizenship to Soviet-era
migrants. Lithuania chose the ‘zero option’ and granted citizenship to all
persons who were legal permanent residents of the country. Thus Russian
41 Gerli Nimmerfeldt, ‘Sense of belonging to Estonia’, in Vetik and Helemäe (eds), The
Russian Second Generation in Tallinn and Kohtla-Järve, 203 28 (217).
42 Duvold, ‘If push comes to shove’, 298.
43 Roger Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New
Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996).
44 Duvold, ‘If push comes to shove’, 298.
45 Brigita Zepa (ed.), Integrācijas Prakse un Perspektı̄vas (Riga: Baltic Institute of Social
Sciences 2006), 73.
46 Arvydas Matulionis, Vida Beresnevičiūtė, Tadas Leončikas, Monika Frėjutė-Rakaus-
kienė, Kristina Šliavaitė, Hans-Georg Heinrich and Olga Alekseeva, The Russian
Minority in Lithuania, ENRI-East Research Report no. 9, 2011, 28, available on the
ENRI-East website at www.enri-east.net/wp-content/uploads/The_Russian_Minority_
in_Lithuania.pdf (viewed 2 May 2013).


































and Polish nationals ‘were granted access to Lithuanian citizenship right
from the start’.47 This is important because formal membership in a
community has long been believed to be an effective tool for overcoming
societal divisions based on culture, providing a sense of belonging and as a
means of promoting social cohesion.48
The Latvian and Estonian political elite chose the nation-state model based
on the legal continuity principle as a means of overcoming the changes to
ethnic composition during the Soviet period, and as the basis of national
identity. Citizenship was automatically granted only to pre-war residents
and their descendants, excluding all Soviet-era migrants. Those Russian-
speakers who had arrived in Estonia or Latvia during the Soviet period and
who wished to acquire citizenship had to demonstrate linguistic competence
and pass a civics examination. This has resulted in a large ‘stateless’
population in both Estonia and Latvia. Naturalization of this ‘stateless’
Russian-speaking population is often mentioned as the ultimate goal of
integration, and seen as the way to overcome social cohesion problems and
promote identification with the country of residence.49
An immigrant’s willingness to undergo the naturalization process has
traditionally been viewed as an indicator of their sense of belonging to the
host society.50 However, data on whether citizenship status alone directly
impacts the sense of belonging of Russian-speakers in the Baltic countries are
inconclusive. The 2004 New Baltic Barometer data show that there is no
direct correlation between the citizenship status of Russian-speakers and
their identification with the country of residence.51 Therefore, integration
initiatives that simply focus on increasing naturalization rates in order to
improve social cohesion are almost certainly inadequate.
It is true that a pre-existing sense of belonging can serve as motivation for
completing the naturalization process and for wanting to formalize a sense
of attachment. However, simply awarding formal membership in a commu-
nity is not enough to encourage the development of a sense of belonging.
The fact that the sense of belonging to Lithuania is more pronounced
among Russian-speakers and Russian-speaking Lithuanian citizens seems to
47 Duvold, ‘If push comes to shove’, 297.
48 Peter Kivisto, ‘Inclusion: Parsons and beyond’, Acta Sociologica, vol. 47, no. 3, 2004,
291.
49 David Laitin, Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad
(Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press 1998); Pål Kolstø (ed.), Nation-
Building and Ethnic Integration in Post-Soviet Societies: An Investigation of Latvia and
Kazakstan (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1999); David J. Galbreath, Nation-Building
and Minority Politics in Post-Socialist States: Interests, Influences and Identities in Estonia
and Latvia (Stuttgart: Ibidem 2005); Muiznieks (ed.), How Integrated Is Latvian Society?.
50 Henry P. H. Chow, ‘Sense of belonging and life satisfaction among Hong Kong
adolescent immigrants in Canada’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 33, no. 3,
2007, 511 20 (513).
51 Duvold, ‘If push comes to shove’, 301.


































suggest that the process of awarding citizenship, specifically early inclusion
in the national political community, may have had an influence on the
overall sense of attachment.
Also important are the actual rights and privileges citizenship bestows,
and the sacrifices, in terms of ethnic identity, that are required in return. As
the central argument of the book Citizenship in Diverse Societies makes clear,
the sense of belonging to a common overarching citizenship identity can
only be achieved if members are afforded full and active participation in the
larger society, while also retaining a minority identity if desired.52 This
argument highlights the second major shortcoming of integration policy in
Estonia and Latvia: the emphasis on cultural and linguistic assimilation.
In the integration policy documents of Estonia and Latvia there is a
tendency to impose a preconceived set of values, with an emphasis on the
majority identity, and very little mention of the protection afforded to
minority identities. This has been highlighted by Estonian studies indicating
‘that Russians perceive the Estonian integration policy as forced ‘‘assimila-
tion’’’.53 In the Latvian case, Juris Rozenvalds has noted elsewhere the one-
sided approach to integration by Latvian authorities, placing the emphasis
on the need for minorities to learn the Latvian language and understand the
country’s history and culture.54
The assimilationist tendencies of these integration policies affect both the
sense of belonging and the perception of cultural threat. Thus, the Estonian
TIES study shows that for Russian-speakers ‘the greatest impact on the
chances of feeling a strong sense of belonging to Estonia relates to a lack of
perception of threat on the cultural identity’.55 In that study, those Russians
who did not perceive a threat to their cultural identity were 8.83 times more
likely to feel a strong connection to Estonia.56 In the Latvian case, the
perception of a threat to language and culture has been noted on both sides.
In a 2006 study, 34 per cent of Russian-speaking respondents claimed that
Russian language and culture in Latvia is under ‘somewhat of a threat’, and
a further 11 per cent expressed feeling a ‘serious threat’.57 Of the Latvian
respondents, 35 per cent claimed that Latvian language and culture in Latvia
is under ‘somewhat of a threat’, and a further 9 per cent claimed feeling a
‘serious threat’.58 This perceived threat to the Latvian language and culture
has both reinforced the emphasis placed in integration policy on knowledge
of the Latvian language and its use, and the perception among the minority
Russian-speakers that their culture is under threat.
52 Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (eds), Citizenship in Diverse Societies (Oxford and
New York: Oxford University Press 2000).
53 Nimmerfeldt, ‘Sense of belonging to Estonia’, 217.
54 Rozenvalds, ‘The Soviet heritage and integration policy development’, 55.
55 Nimmerfeldt, ‘Sense of belonging to Estonia’, 221.
56 Ibid., 216.
57 Zepa (ed.), Integrācijas Prakse un Perspektı̄vas, 76.
58 Ibid., 75.


































Challenges facing social cohesion in the Baltic states
In addressing the theme of social cohesion, the aim of this article has been to
demonstrate the struggles faced by Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in over-
coming the ethno-linguistic cleavages that are the legacy of Soviet rule, and to
look at the particular approaches taken by the Baltic states in facilitating social
inclusion and integration. The analysis suggests that, in their integration
policies, the Baltic states have stressed the imposition of the majority language
and culture on minorities, while neglecting systematic efforts to address socio-
economic inequality in general and ethnic inequality in particular. All three
states have struggled to overcome the Soviet policies of bilingualism and
restore the primacy of the titular language. However, the perception of threat
to the Lithuanian language and culture has been less salient due to the smaller
overall total percentage of Russian-speakers in the country. Thus Lithuania
has been able to opt for early inclusion of Russian-speakers in the polity and,
as a result, generate a greater sense of belonging to Lithuania among them.
In Estonia and Latvia, the internalization of cultural norms and language
knowledge has been regarded as a prerequisite for access to citizenship and
formal membership. Yet this approach has largely failed in fostering a sense
of belonging. The analysis suggests that there is a serious misfit between the
stated policy goal of integration and the attempts to promote social cohesion
in the Baltic states. The perceived threat to minority cultural identity
resulting from assimilationist policies has been shown to lower significantly
the odds that feelings of belonging will develop towards the country of
residence. The article suggests that there are critical challenges ahead for
Estonia and Latvia in achieving social cohesion, in the sense of membership
within the same community and feelings of mutual recognition.
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